Electrons at War: How Modern Militaries Came to Run Lithium

In brief

Lithium-ion batteries now power every layer of a modern military: soldier-worn electronics (roughly nine kilograms of batteries per NATO infantryman on a 72-hour patrol), drones, submarines, satellites and directed-energy weapons. Land systems account for about 61 per cent of military battery demand, per the research firm Mordor Intelligence.

Ukraine produced between 4 and 5 million drones in 2025, targets more than 7 million in 2026, and holds annual production capacity above 8 million first-person-view (FPV) attack drones — by most estimates more than all NATO members combined. Ukrainian officials attribute roughly 60 per cent of Russian equipment losses to these systems.

The cost asymmetry driving this shift is notable: a Ukrainian Sting interceptor drone costs about $2,500 against more than $3 million for a US Patriot PAC-3 missile performing the same air-defence task — and Lockheed Martin built around 600 PAC-3s last year while Ukraine expended roughly 700 in four winter months.

The battery-dependent force?

Lithium-ion cells occupy virtually every layer of a modern military. The infantry soldier carries radios, optics, GPS units and thermal imagers; a fully equipped NATO infantryman on a 72-hour patrol hauls roughly nine kilograms of batteries. This burden explains the procurement attention devoted to the US Army's Conformal Wearable Battery, a flat, body-worn power pack of which the manufacturer Inventus Power has delivered some 150,000 units.

Unmanned systems in the air, on the ground, on the sea surface and beneath it run almost entirely on lithium chemistry. Submarines — historically the largest defence battery market, and a stronghold of lead-acid technology for a century — are leading the switch: Japan's Taigei-class boats already sail on lithium-ion cells, and analysts at the battery research firm Rho Motion note that undersea demand has shifted decisively toward lithium as the commercial industry scaled up and cut costs.

Satellites standardised on lithium-ion years ago, and the satellite layer is increasingly military in character. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) constellations are proliferating, and in December 2024 the European Space Agency signed contracts for IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite), a planned constellation of roughly 300 satellites intended to give EU governments secure communications.

Directed-energy weapons — lasers and high-power microwave systems that damage targets with concentrated energy rather than projectiles — depend on high-rate lithium cells to buffer their pulse loads: brief demands for very large amounts of power, delivered over seconds, that no generator can supply on its own. The US military's own Lithium Battery Strategy 2023–2030 lists directed energy alongside unmanned systems and tactical vehicle electrification as the capabilities driving its battery requirements. (A note on names and access: the US Department of Defense was renamed the Department of War in 2025 under the second Trump administration; this series uses the current name except in the titles of documents published under the old one. The full Lithium Battery Strategy circulates only among US government personnel and contractors, but the department's Industrial Base Policy office publishes a summary and FAQ at businessdefense.gov, and has committed to refreshing the strategy every three years — meaning a revision is due in 2026.)

On land, hybrid-electric vehicles supply "silent watch": the ability to run sensors, jammers and command systems with the engine off and the vehicle's heat signature suppressed. Mordor Intelligence estimates that land systems alone account for roughly 61 per cent of military battery demand, and the modernised M1E3 Abrams tank programme treats battery packs as auxiliary power for command suites, countermeasures and, eventually, directed-energy weapons.

The drone war as demand signal

Drones have transformed the conversation, and Ukraine supplies the data. The country produced roughly 2.2 million unmanned aerial vehicles in 2024 and between 4 and 5 million in 2025; its Defence Ministry now targets more than 7 million in 2026, with capacity for FPV drones alone — first-person-view aircraft, flown by a pilot watching live video from an onboard camera through goggles — exceeding 8 million units a year. By most estimates that output surpasses all NATO members combined. Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council attributes roughly 60 per cent of Russian equipment losses to FPV strikes.

Russia, for its part, launched more than 54,000 Shahed-type drones against Ukraine in 2025 — Iranian-designed, long-range, one-way attack aircraft that Russia now manufactures domestically and launches in waves of hundreds per night. Each wave requires a response, and the response is itself battery-powered: a Ukrainian Sting interceptor drone costs about $2,500, against more than $3 million for a US-made Patriot PAC-3 missile performing the same task. Lockheed Martin produced approximately 600 PAC-3 interceptors last year; Ukraine expended roughly 700 in four winter months of 2025–26. The production gap, as much as the price gap, explains why Western militaries have adopted the doctrine now labelled "precision mass": procuring millions of cheap, expendable munitions rather than hundreds of exquisite ones. Every one of those expendable airframes carries a lithium battery.

The Qualitative Conclusion

As of mid-2026, militaries are structurally dependent on lithium electrochemistry across every operational domain. What that dependence amounts to in tonnes, dollars and market power is a separate question — and the answer, developed in Part II, is smaller and stranger than the procurement headlines imply.

Next in the series: Part II — The Arithmetic of Military Demand.

Principal sources: US Department of War, Lithium Battery Strategy 2023–2030 (summary at businessdefense.gov); Mordor Intelligence, Military Battery Market report (2025); Ukraine National Security and Defence Council, defence-industry results (2026); OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, Game of Drones (October 2025); Just Security, How Ukraine Became a Drone Superpower (June 2026); Aviation Week (April 2026); Rho Motion via Benchmark Source (2025).